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UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AS A SOURCE FOR GLOBAL SALES LAW
HENRY DEEB GABRIEL*
THE germination period for the United Nations Convention on Con-tracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) was forty-five years,
and once it was completed it was slow to be adopted.  It is now showing its
age, and the question has been posed as to whether it is time to revise or
expand its scope.  Given its history, though, whether a revision or expan-
sion of the CISG is a viable project that justifies the resources is subject to
serious question.
Among the problems this project might encounter is a lack of re-
sources, a clear articulation of the need for the project, the inability to
define its scope, and the likelihood of widespread ratification within a rea-
sonable time.  Recent attempts to revise domestic and regional laws are
instructive about the possible problems this project may have.
It may be that the barriers for a future convention on global contract
law is not a realistic project, and the more recent path of soft law instru-
ments, such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts (Principles), is a more viable method of providing global uni-
formity in contracts.  Alternatively, another path is to replicate the crea-
tion of the CISG by relying on an initial product from UNIDROIT that
provides for UNIDROIT’s distinct working methods, and then have that
work as the basis for a convention on global contract law, through the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
This would entail a close working relationship between UNIDROIT and
UNCITRAL.
I. A NEW PROJECT?
At the last Plenary Meeting of UNCITRAL in the summer of 2012, the
government of Switzerland proposed that UNCITRAL undertake a project
to develop an instrument, presumably a binding convention,1 to harmo-
nize principles of contract law (hereinafter the proposal).2  The scope of
the project proposed is very ambitious.3
* Professor of Law, Elon University; member of the drafting committee and
chair of the editorial committee of the 2010 UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts.
1. The proposal cites as one of the faults of the UNIDROIT Principles of In-
ternational Commercial Contracts, and therefore as a justification of the new pro-
ject, the fact that the Principles are not binding law. See UNCITRAL, Possible Future
Work in the Area of International Contract Law: Proposal by Switzerland on Possible Future
Work by UNCITRAL in the Area of International Contract Law, at 4–5, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/758 (May 8, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal].
2. See id. at 3.
3. The proposal sets out the following as possible topics:
(661)
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The proposal was met with some strong opposition, and there was no
strong support for it.4  Regardless, it was concluded that the Secretariat
should organize colloquia and undertake further study of the project.5
This conference is part of the Secretariat’s mandate.  In this paper I ex-
amine whether this project is a feasible one, and if so, whether UNIDROIT
and its work can play a significant role in the forging of a global contract
law.
Initially it must be recognized that the proposal asserts, but does not
demonstrate a need for, an international convention on contract law.
Before discussing the possible need for the project, as an initial inquiry, I
would like to address what may be some drawbacks to UNCITRAL under-
taking this project.
[G]eneral provisions, among others: freedom of contract, freedom of
form; formation of contract, among others: offer, acceptance, modifica-
tion, discharge by assent, standard terms, battle of forms, electronic con-
tracting; agency, among others: authority, disclosed/undisclosed agency,
liability of the agent; validity, among others: mistake, fraud, duress, gross
disparity, unfair terms, illegality; construction of contract, among others:
interpretation, supplementation, practices and usages; conditions; third
party rights; performance of contract, among others: time, place, cur-
rency, costs; remedies for breach of contract, among others: right to with-
hold performance, specific performance, avoidance, damages,
exemptions; consequences of unwinding; set-off; assignment and delega-
tion, among others: assignment of rights, delegation of performance of
duty, transfer of contracts; limitation; joint and several obligors and
obligees.
Id. at 7 n.4.
4. A summary of the debate is contained in the Report of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law. See Rep. of United Nations Comm’n on
Int’l Trade, June 25–July 6, 2012, ¶¶ 127–32, U.N. Doc. A/67/17, 45th Sess. [here-
inafter UNCITRAL Report].  In the United States, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has also come out against the proposal.
There are several areas for suggested coverage in the proposal that would be of
particular concern for American law.  These include the general difficulty with
reconciling American law and the common law with other legal traditions—for
example, defects of consent, the nature of software contracts, consumer contracts,
unfair contracts, and, pre-contractual information duties.
5. The official report states the following:
After discussion, it was determined that there was a prevailing view in
support of requesting the Secretariat to organize symposiums and other
meetings, including at the regional level and within available resources,
maintaining close cooperation with U[NIDROIT], with a view to compil-
ing further information to assist the Commission in the assessment of the
desirability and feasibility of future work in the field of general contract
law at a future session.  Many delegates, however, urged that priority
should be given to other work of the Commission, in particular in the
area of microfinance.  A number of delegates expressed clear opposition
and strong reservations with regard to further work in the field of general
contract law.  In addition, several delegates, noting the significant opposi-
tion to the proposal by Switzerland, objected to the characterization of
the debate on that topic as reflecting a prevailing majority view in favour
of additional work.
Id. ¶ 132.
2
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A. Limited Resources
UNCITRAL is facing significant budget pressures, as are many of its
member states.  Given this, the proposal, which would take many years to
complete and which would use significant resources of UNCITRAL, would
appear to need a strong justification for moving forward.  Because the
member states will have the final decision whether to go forward with the
proposal, those states that have raised the issue of resources for this pro-
ject6 can be expected to continue with this objection.
It should also be noted that after several decades of work, UNIDROIT
has recently completed Part III of the UNIDROIT Principles at a substan-
tial allocation of the financial resources available to UNIDROIT.  Several
countries that are members of both UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL have sug-
gested that this project would be redundant and repetitive of work already
completed, and therefore would be a waste of limited resources available
for UNCITRAL’s other work.7
B. Flawed Justifications
The proposal suggests two major reasons for the need of a new instru-
ment.  Neither is supported by any empirical evidence.  First, it is sug-
gested that “[i]t goes without saying that different domestic laws form an
obstacle for international trade . . . .”8  At best, this is anecdotal and un-
proven.  The fact that parties still routinely opt out of the CISG would
belie this assertion.  Second, it is suggested that “[t]oday’s international
sales practice shows that contracts—by the choice of the parties—tend to
be governed by a closed circle of domestic laws . . . .”9  Assuming this is
true, it alone does not justify a global contract law, as there is no evidence
that parties who choose a specific domestic law to govern their transac-
tions are unhappy with their choices.
Evidence suggests just the opposite.  It is not the specific law gov-
erning the transaction that parties are normally concerned about.  Usu-
ally, the concern by parties is knowing with certainty in advance which law
will govern the transaction in order to be able to contract around the de-
fault provisions.
Implicit, but not stated in the proposal, is the assumption that one
party may be disadvantaged by current choice of law provisions that favor
an existing law.  Yet there is no evidence that a specific commonly used law
of contract actually disfavors any parties.  Nor is there any evidence that
the parties that are now choosing a specific law under a choice of law
6. See id. ¶ 130.
7. See id. ¶ 131.
8. Proposal, supra note 1, at 2.
9. Id. at 3.
3
Gabriel: Unidroit Principles as a Source for Global Sales Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR411.txt unknown Seq: 4 11-JUL-13 8:39
664 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 661
clause will somehow be dissuaded from making the same choice in the
future.10
C. Need
The proposal suggests the need for both a revision of the present pro-
visions of the CISG as well as an expansion of the scope of the sales con-
vention.11  The probability of either occurring is not likely.
1. Revising the CISG
Before undertaking a revision of the CISG, two considerations must
be examined: whether there are substantial existing flaws in the CISG that
need to be remedied, and the likelihood that the project would be success-
ful.  As to the first question, there is no evidence that serious flaws in the
existing CISG have been articulated.12  It is neutral and does not favor any
particular party.  Its wide use suggests it has not found any major detrac-
tors among potential users.  In fact, the CISG has been “a worldwide suc-
cess.”13  At present, with seventy-eight contracting states, it has been one
of the most successful private international law treaties ever entered into
force.14
Moreover, to the extent that parties are dissatisfied with any of the
provisions of the CISG, these provisions can be easily and effectively modi-
fied to meet the parties’ requirements.15  The CISG, as with all modern
sales codes, is primarily a set of default rules that can easily be modified or
disclaimed.16  This inherent flexibility allows the maximum in party auton-
omy and therefore militates against the need for revision.
The larger problem that arises is not the substance of the CISG, but
the process by which it would be revised.  Although the CISG is one of the
more successful international commercial instruments, having been rati-
fied by seventy-eight countries, it took years before it became widely rati-
fied.  Promulgated by UNCITRAL in 1980, the United States became a
party only in 1989, Japan in 2008.  The Scandinavian countries have just
ratified Part II this year.  Given this slow and uneven adoption, there has
justifiably been great reluctance to reopen the CISG.
10. If the parties have bothered to put in a choice of law clause, the parties
presumably know to contract around those provisions of the law they have chosen
that do not reflect the agreement they wish to have.
11. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 6–8.
12. See, e.g., Henry Deeb Gabriel, The CISG: Raising the Fear of Nothing, 9
VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 219, 219 (2005).
13. INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, GLOBAL
SALES AND CONTRACT LAW ¶ 3.20 (2012).
14. For a discussion on how the CISG has been a source for other law, see
supra note 13, ¶¶ 3.20–.24.
15. See Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 6,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncitral
.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
16. See id.
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It is worthwhile to remember that originally the 2005 UNCITRAL
Electronic Commerce Convention was intended to amend the CISG, but
quickly morphed into a free-standing instrument because of the fear of
reopening the CISG.  These reservations still justifiably exist.  The particu-
lar concern is the possibility of two competing instruments—an original
and a revised CISG.
2. Expanding Scope Beyond the CISG
To draft a global contracts law convention more expansive than the
CISG, as suggested in the proposal,17 will require coverage of subject areas
specifically chosen not to be covered by the CISG, and many of these areas
were not covered because of the difficulty of universal consensus.  Thus,
for example, the proposal suggests rules to govern the validity of con-
tracts.18  This is one area that the drafters of the CISG not only did not
provide for, but specifically added an article to exclude it from the scope
of the convention.19
It is not persuasive that because some of these topics are covered in
the UNIDROIT Principles, that they are easily accommodated in a binding
17. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 3.
18. For example, issues of substantive validity were generally excluded from
the scope of the CISG pursuant to Article 4, based primarily on a Secretariat report
finding that: (1) these issues rarely arise, and that there was no indication that
differences in the laws in respect to contract validity lead to significant problems in
international trade; and (2) “rules on duress, or similar rules on usury, uncon-
scionable contracts, good faith in performance and the like serve as a vehicle by
which the political, social, and economic philosophy of the society is made effec-
tive in respect of contracts,” and:
[I]t is by the extensive or the restrictive interpretation of such rules that
many legal systems have effected the balance between a philosophy of
sanctity of contract with the security of transactions which that affords
and a philosophy of protecting the weaker party to a transaction at the
cost of rendering contracts less secure.
U.N. Secretary-General, Formation and Validity of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 25–26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/128, Annex II (Feb.
3, 1977), reprinted in [1977] 8 Y.B. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. 93, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/SER.A/1977.  States subsequently decided to exclude specific rules on valid-
ity with regard to mistake because of their inconsistent treatment under various
legal systems. See Rep. of the Working Group, Sept. 19–Sept. 30, 1977, ¶¶ 48–69, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/142, 9th Sess., reprinted in [1978] 9 Y.B. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L.
61, 65–66, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1978 (discussing decision to exclude specific
rules on validity, particularly with regard to mistake).  Similarly, efforts to address
issues related to agency were not successful. See, e.g., Rep. of the Working Group, Jan.
27–Feb. 7, 1975, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/100, 6th Sess., reprinted in [1975] 6 Y.B.
Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. 49, 53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1975 (“There was
opposition to a special article on agency relationships in a convention on sales and
no consensus was reached on the adoption of this proposal.  At the same time it
was agreed to delete any reference to agency relationship in other articles of the
Convention . . . .”).  UNIDROIT subsequently developed a Convention on Agency
in the International Sale of Goods, but only a few countries have ratified it and it
has never entered into force. See United Nations Convention on Agency in the
International Sale of Goods, Feb. 17, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 249.
19. See CISG, supra note 15, art. 4.
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convention.  As is discussed below, both the working methods of
UNIDROIT, as well as the differences between the soft law nature of the
UNIDROIT Principles and the binding nature of the CISG as a conven-
tion, do not allow for an easy adaptation in convention form of all of the
areas covered in the UNIDROIT Principles.
It is worth noting that the proposal also suggests some areas of cover-
age that are beyond what would normally be found in general contract
law.20  For example, shipping terms are suggested as a topic.21  This seems
an odd addition.  Shipping terms are not part of the general law of con-
tract, and there is no international consensus on standard shipping terms.
The INCOTERMS22 come close, and there appears to be no problem that
needs to be addressed in this area.
II. HAS UNIDROIT ALREADY DONE THE WORK?
If the proposal becomes a working project, as the proposal is, to a
significant extent, a proposal to cover areas already covered in the
UNIDROIT Principles, the result of the project would be to create a bind-
ing convention out of what is presently a soft law instrument.23  Thus, any
significant justification for the proposal must be based on the need to sup-
plement or supplant the UNIDROIT Principles with a similar binding
convention.
It must also be noted that the UNIDROIT Principles have had rela-
tively little usage and impact since first promulgated in 1994.  Unless there
is some compelling distinction between the Principles and a binding con-
vention that suggests a greater likelihood of party usage of the convention,
the need for the convention would appear already to be shown as
minimal.
That the convention would be binding where the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples are not does not suggest a need for the project.  Moreover, even with
a binding convention, there is the question of whether parties would rou-
tinely opt out of its application, or whether countries would even see the
need to ratify the convention in the first place.  Both of the concerns go to
the larger question of whether the members of UNCITRAL are willing to
commit to the long process of drafting a global sales law convention with-
out more evidence of a compelling need.
The proposal suggests that a convention is necessary to supplant the
UNIDROIT Principles because courts are reluctant to give effect to soft
law instruments.24  However, lawyers appreciate the difference between a
20. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 7 n.4.
21. See id.  For an exhaustive list of Switzerland’s proposed areas of coverage,
see supra note 3.
22. Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Incoterms 2000, ICC Pub. no. 560 (2000).
23. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 4–5 (explicitly stating that goal of project is to
create binding convention out of soft law instrument).
24. See id. at 5.
6
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choice of law provision and the incorporation of the Principles as terms to
an agreement, and it is quite easy to choose the Principles as governing
the contractual relationship if parties wish.
There is an assumption in the proposal that if UNIDROIT could
agree on these areas of contract, a convention could be negotiated along
the same lines.  As will be discussed below, this ignores core differences
between the UNIDROIT Principles and a binding UNCITRAL convention.
The fact that the UNIDROIT Principles are non-binding and therefore do
not have the same importance and urgency, a binding convention creates
some distinct advantages.
However, before addressing the questions of whether the convention
would serve important functions not met by the UNIDROIT Principles
and whether the drafting of a convention on global contract law in and of
itself is a feasible project, I want to first examine the advantages that the
UNIDROIT Principles have as a soft law instrument.
A. General Advantages
In many circumstances, particularly in the area of private interna-
tional law, soft law instruments,25 such as the Principles, have advantages
over conventions and treaties.  For example, non-binding general princi-
ples can achieve the goal of uniform, or at least harmonized law,26 be-
25. Non-binding legal principles are often referred to as “soft law.”  “ ‘[S]oft
law’ is understood as referring in general to instruments of a normative nature
with no legally binding force, and which are applied only through voluntary ac-
ceptance . . . .”  Michael Joachim Bonell, Soft Law and Party Autonomy: The Case of the
UNIDROIT Principles, 51 LOY. L. REV. 229, 229 (2005).  These are generally estab-
lished legal rules that are not positive law and are therefore not judicially binding.
See id.  The various soft law instruments in international commercial law include
model laws, a codification of custom and usage promulgated by an international
non-governmental organization, the promulgation of international trade terms,
model forms, contracts, restatements by leading scholars and experts, or interna-
tional conventions. See id.  Although soft law principles do not begin as positive
law, they can of course become positive law both by adoption by courts or tribunals
or by adoption in the agreements of transactional parties. See id.
26. UNCITRAL notes the following distinction between harmonization and
unification:
“Harmonization” and “unification” of the law of international trade refers
to the process through which the law facilitating international commerce
is created and adopted.  International commerce may be hindered by fac-
tors such as the lack of a predictable governing law or out-of-date laws
unsuited to commercial practice.  The United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law identifies such problems and then carefully
crafts solutions which are acceptable to States having different legal sys-
tems and levels of economic and social development.
“Harmonization” may conceptually be thought of as the process
through which domestic laws may be modified to enhance predictability
in cross-border commercial transactions.  “Unification” may be seen as
the adoption by States of a common legal standard governing particular
aspects of international business transactions.  A model law or a legislative
guide is an example of a text which is drafted to harmonize domestic law,
while a convention is an international instrument which is adopted by
7
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cause there is less necessity to accommodate various legal traditions or
domestic laws.  Also, they may be adopted in part as well as a whole,
thereby providing flexibility for an easier basis for adoption in a given
court or arbitration because there is less conflict between the international
and the domestic law as there would be in the case of a binding conven-
tion.27  In addition, because there is no need to have principles adopted
by a given jurisdiction, the principles are more easily and readily available
for use.  Since these principles are not binding, their likely effect is more
to set norms instead of hard and fast rules, while still achieving the goal of
creating broad international standards.28
States for the unification of the law at an international level.  Texts result-
ing from the work of UNCITRAL include conventions, model laws, legal
guides, legislative guides, rules, and practice notes.  In practice, the two
concepts are closely related.
FAQ—Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL, http://www.un
citral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin_faq.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).  I think
this distinction is important because many, including myself, see true international
unification as a goal that may not be possible given the different legal traditions in
the world.  Harmonization, on the other hand, is a much more reachable goal.
27. In addition to the UNIDROIT Principles, some of the other more success-
ful soft law instruments are the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the more recent
UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, and the UNCI-
TRAL legislative guide to secured transactions.  Private organizations, such as the
International Chamber of Commerce, have a long history of drafting very success-
ful soft law documents.  In the case of the ICC, this would include the highly influ-
ential INCOTERMS (shipping terms) and the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits (letters of credit).
28. Of the three major international governmental organizations that are del-
egated the task to produce international commercial law instruments—UNCI-
TRAL, UNIDROIT, and the Hague Conference on Private International Law—two
of the organizations, UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL, have been quite active in pro-
ducing soft law instruments because of these broad advantages for soft law
instruments.
UNCITRAL is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, established in 1966.  The Commission has a general mandate to harmonize
and unify the law of international trade.  Since its founding, UNCITRAL has pre-
pared a wide range of conventions, model laws, and other instruments that deal
with the substantive law that governs trade transactions or other aspects of business
law which have an impact on international trade.  UNCITRAL is made up of sixty
member states from five regional groups.  Members of the Commission are elected
for terms of six years.  The terms of half the members expire every three years.
Membership will increase to sixty member states over the next few years to provide
greater representation.
UNIDROIT is an independent intergovernmental organization with its seat in
Rome.  The purpose of UNIDROIT is to study the needs and the methods for
modernizing and harmonizing private law, particularly commercial law, at the in-
ternational level.  UNIDROIT was created in 1926 as an auxiliary organ of the
League of Nations.  Following the demise of the League of Nations, UNIDROIT
was reestablished in 1940 on the basis of a multilateral agreement.  This agreement
is known as the UNIDROIT Statute, and the membership of UNIDROIT is re-
stricted to states that have acceded to the statute.  There are presently fifty-nine
member states.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law consists of sixty-four
member states.  The First Session of the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
8
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Although suggested in the proposal that parties are disadvantaged by
non-binding rules such as the Principles,29 the proposal presents no evi-
dence of this.  In fact, in many areas, well-known soft law instruments have
become the international standards, and there has never been any sugges-
tion that these instruments suffer any usage or recognition disabilities.
Thus, for example, the UCP 60030 and the INCOTERMS,31 are so com-
monly used and accepted today that they often govern by default, absent a
contrary party agreement.
B. Harmonization of the Positive Law Is Fraught with Difficulties
A UNCITRAL convention on global sales law would not be drafted in
a vacuum, but would be drafted with the backdrop of the CISG as well as
the various domestic laws of the member states.  In the case of a new treaty
or convention, there is the strong desire by the adopting jurisdictions to
have the treaty or convention be consistent with the domestic law of the
jurisdiction.32  Yet, the ability to harmonize a new treaty or convention
with existing domestic or international law is subject to a variety of difficul-
ties.33  This is particularly the case if there is an existing convention or
treaty such as the CISG being revised instead of being drafted anew.  Con-
tional Law was convened in 1893 by the Netherlands on the initiative of T.M.C.
Asser, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1911.  Subsequent sessions were held in
1894, 1900, 1904, 1925, and 1928.  The Seventh Session was held in 1951, and this
session culminated with the preparation of a statute, which made the Conference a
permanent intergovernmental organization.  The statute entered into force on
July 15, 1955.  Since 1956, regular Plenary Sessions have been held every four
years.  Under the statute, the Netherlands Standing Government Committee on
Private International Law ensures the operation of the Conference.
29. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 5.
30. Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits 600, ICC Pub. no. 600 (July 1, 2007).
31. Incoterms 2000, supra note 22.
32. This, of course, may include international laws that are part of the domes-
tic law of a given jurisdiction.
33. Thus, for example, after twelve years of work revising the American Uni-
form Commercial Code, the fruits of attempting to harmonize the Uniform Com-
mercial Code with the CISG were reduced to the following prefatory comment:
When the parties enter into an agreement for the international sale of
goods, because the United States is a party to the Convention, the appli-
cable law may be the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG).  Since many of the provisions of the
CISG appear quite similar to provisions in Article 2, early in the process
of drafting the amendments the drafting committee considered making
references in the Official Comments to similar provisions in the CISG.
However, upon reflection, the drafting committee concluded that these
references should not be included because their inclusion might suggest
a greater similarity between the Article 2 and the CISG than in fact exists.
Henry Deeb Gabriel, Universalism and Tradition: The Use of Non-Binding Principles in
International Commercial Law, in LIBER MEMORIALIS: UNIVERSALISM, TRADITION, AND
THE INDIVIDUAL 474 n.15 (Petar Sˇarcˇevic´ ed., 2006).
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versely, soft law instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles were not
subject to the same pressure to be harmonized with existing law.
As for a private international law convention such as the proposal for
a global sales law, inevitably the actual and perceived problems of the ex-
isting statute, which will be primarily the CISG, would have to be ad-
dressed.  With the revision of an existing convention or treaty, the focus
tends to be inward-looking and focused on the existing convention or
treaty itself.  In addition, the revisers of an existing convention or treaty
will bring to the process their familiarity with the existing convention or
treaty.  As such, it is likely that they are less familiar with other laws that
might be appropriate to consider for purposes of drafting the ideal instru-
ment that is most compatible with modern business practices.  Moreover,
to the extent that there is a push to harmonize across the different legal
traditions of the various states involved in the drafting of the convention
or treaty, compromises, both in the language as well as the legal concepts,
may have to be made which do not necessarily reflect the best view, but
simply a view that all parties can agree upon as consistent with their inter-
nal law.34
This is not the case with soft law instruments, and the UNIDROIT
Principles are an example of this.  With the Principles, it was not necessary
to attempt to harmonize the entirety of any specific jurisdiction or any
international convention, such as the CISG.  Instead, without the internal
pressure to conform to a specific law, the drafters were able to pick provi-
sions selectively among many sources to meet a specific need.  This pro-
cess of picking and choosing provided for systematic reflection on what
should be the best result, and not simply a possible result.
C. No Need to Accommodate Specific Legal Traditions or National Laws
As will certainly be the case in the proposed global contract law con-
vention, there would be a strong tendency toward the creation of an in-
strument that would reflect the legal traditions of the potential adopting
states because treaties and conventions must be fashioned in a way to en-
courage adoption by various states, in order to create a high comfort level
with the appropriateness of the instrument.  This would inevitably result in
an attempt to reconcile differing legal traditions, and would create
problems both in terms of the time necessary to finish the instrument as
well as the actual substance of the resulting convention.
Preparation of international commercial law conventions and treaties
tends to be a long process, and part of the long length of time is attributa-
ble to the incessant search for common principles and the reconciliation
34. Much of the success of the CISG, for example, is based on the fact that the
CISG is not based on any particular set of underlying established domestic legal
principles, and instead, was drafted to be independent of, rather than to work in
conjunction with, any particular domestic law.  To the extent that one can attach a
specific legal tradition to the CISG, it is a blend of both the common law and
civilian traditions.
10
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of established principles from different legal systems and traditions.  This
need was a large part of the reason why the CISG took years to prepare
even though it began with the template of the Hague Sales Convention.
Moreover, the CISG is fairly limited in its coverage, and to a large
extent this is due to the inability to reconcile the major legal traditions.
For example, questions of validity, title, and property rights35 are specifi-
cally excluded from the CISG, as are consumer contracts36 and product
liability actions.37  Yet, these are some of the proposed coverage areas in
the global contract law proposal.38
Possibly more important, the need to accommodate specific legal tra-
ditions locks the drafters into a straightjacket of limited possibilities that
often prevents the examination for the best solution.  This is often politi-
cally driven.  The late Professor Allan Farnsworth, for example, describes
what distinguished the work leading to the CISG, in which he was an
American delegate, and the work leading to the UNIDROIT Principles, in
which he was a member of the working group: “While the atmosphere in
UNCITRAL was political (because delegates represented governments,
which were grouped in regional blocs), that in UNIDROIT was apolitical
(because participants appeared in their private capacity).”39
For this reason, the UNIDROIT Principles are viewed as “neutral”
contract law principles in that they reflect a balance of interests and have
not been formulated by any government.  It is not clear that the CISG has
this level of neutrality or whether a new expanded draft could be neutral
either.
D. No Need for Ratification
Soft law, unlike treaties and conventions, are not subject to the
lengthy process of ratification that can hold up enforcement for years.40
For example, one of the most successful international conventions in re-
cent times, the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), was
completed in 1958 but not ratified by the United States until 1970.  More-
over, although the New York Convention has been very successful, this has
not been the case with many recent international commercial law conven-
35. See CISG, supra note 15, arts. 4(a)–(b).
36. See id. art. 2(a).
37. See id. art. 5.
38. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 7 n.4.
39. E. Allan Farnsworth, The American Provenance of the UNIDROIT Principles, 72
TUL. L. REV. 1985, 1989 (1998).
40. This can be the case with domestic law as well.  For example, after a thir-
teen year drafting process of the revisions of Article Two of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, the revisions were withdrawn from consideration a decade later after
there had been no adoptions by any states. See Henry Deeb Gabriel, The 2003
Amendments of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: Eight Years or a Lifetime After
Completion, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 487, 493 (2011).
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tions.41  In addition, in a federal system, such as the United States, Ca-
nada, or Mexico, ratification often entails complicated political
maneuvering between the federal and the state or provincial
governments.42
It has been suggested that soft law instruments, such as the Principles,
have been successful precisely because:
[T]hey are not binding, have not been influenced by govern-
ments and do not pose any threat to national legal systems.  Like
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration, they are designed to
be a unifying influence and a resource, but it is left to legisla-
tures, courts and arbitral tribunals to decide to what extent they
assist in the solution of problems.43
E. Flexible Guidance for Tribunals
Soft law instruments, such as principles and restatements, have been
widely used by courts and arbitrations as a basis for forging new legal rules,
as well as interpreting existing ones.  In the common law world, particu-
larly the United States, courts have long relied upon the various Restate-
ments of the Law produced by the American Law Institute as a source of
law.  Moreover, arbitration tribunals, which are generally not bound by
domestic choice of law restrictions, often adopt legal rules, such as the
UNIDROIT Principles, because of the neutrality of the rules.  This flexible
use, which allows dynamic growth of the law, is not possible through a
fixed, adopted text such as a convention.
Moreover, soft law is often used as a basis for gap fillers when the
otherwise applicable international or domestic law does not address the
specific question.  For example, because the UNIDROIT Principles have a
broader scope than the CISG, the Principles have been used to resolve
questions not addressed by the CISG.44
41. The 1964 Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale
of Goods, which was the basis for the CISG, has only been ratified by eight coun-
tries. See Convention on International Sale of Goods and Formation of Contracts
for International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 3 I.L.M. 854.
42. Obviously, a similar problem exists between the European Union and its
member states.
43. Roy Goode, Communication on European Contract Law (n.d.), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_
law/comments/5.6.pdf.
44. See, e.g., Hideo Yoshimoto v. Canterbury Golf Int’l Ltd. (2001) 1 NZLR
523 (CA) 547 (N.Z.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/001127n6.
html; Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, Oct. 23, 1996 (Fr.),
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/961023f1.html.  Whether this gui-
dance is always useful may be questioned because, with the convenience of having
existing rules in place, there is some reported tendency of tribunals to follow soft
law principles blindly without any analysis of why the rules are appropriate or
whether the rules are better suited for the issue than competing rules. See, e.g.,
Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern
Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 508, 508–14 (1998); Symeon C.
12
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III. WHAT COULD BE ACHIEVED WITH THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS MIGHT NOT BE
SUBJECT TO REPLICATION AT UNCITRAL
Putting aside the question of whether the Principles themselves have
largely achieved what might be gained from a global contract law conven-
tion, there is also the question of whether UNCITRAL would be able to
replicate the work and product of UNIDROIT.  A comparison between the
working methods of UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL may suggest difficulties
that UNCITRAL would have with this project that were not present in
UNIDROIT’s drafting of the Principles.
The working methods of UNIDROIT may be better suited for this
type of project.  The UNIDROIT Principles were drafted by a select group
of contract specialists from around the world who knew their own coun-
try’s law, were fluent in comparative law, and therefore were able to bal-
ance competing legal traditions.  The members of the UNIDROIT
working group did not have the task of supporting and defending their
respective domestic laws.  This type of work is much harder to accomplish
at UNCITRAL because members of the UNCITRAL working groups re-
present their respective governments.  Thus, both the working methods of
UNIDROIT, a small group of highly specialized experts in the field, as well
as the lack of the need to accommodate any particular nation’s domestic
laws, allowed for a more neutral process and result than might be ex-
pected out of a UNCITRAL drafting process.  Moreover, the scope of the
Principles covers a variety of subjects that a UNCITRAL convention is not
likely to be able to resolve because the mandatory nature of a convention
will have individual countries disagreeing over some issues that were not
contentious in UNIDROIT.
It is also important to keep in mind that the drafting of the
UNIDROIT Principles had some difficulties that the uninitiated may not
appreciate.  An example is illegal contracts.  The UNIDROIT Working
Group spent five years on this subject and was unable to come up with any
rule to govern illegal contracts.45  It should be borne in mind that this was
Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Bless-
ing, 56 MD. L. REV. 1248, 1272–73 (1997).  There is the question of whether the
instrument is intended to reflect current commercial practice or whether the in-
strument is intended to reflect the drafters’ aspirations as to what the law should
be.  Sometimes an instrument can be both.  This is certainly the case with the
American Restatements of the Law, which are drafted by the American Law Insti-
tute. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1981).  However, to the extent that the
principles were drafted carefully and thoughtfully, this concern should be mini-
mal.  The courts, in effect, are likely to stumble upon the best rule.
45. The result is an article that repeats the pre-existing rule that the Princi-
ples are “concerned only with a contract infringing mandatory rules.” INT’L INST.
FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/
principles/contracts/main.htm.
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from a working group that did not have any need to replicate the concepts
of illegality from their respective jurisdictions.46  One can only imagine
the difficulty this would pose if a convention attempted to accommodate
the laws of over sixty jurisdictions.
IV. COULD THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES SERVE AS THE SOURCE
OF A NEW CONVENTION?
If UNCITRAL moves forward with a project on global contract law,
the UNIDROIT Principles may serve as a model and a starting point for
the project.  Although a global contract law project would not necessarily
retain the scope in the Swiss proposal, it is important to remember that
the possible scope set out in the Swiss proposal, for the most part, repli-
cates the scope of the UNIDROIT Principles.47
Furthermore, the UNCITRAL plenary, when considering the possibil-
ity of the proposal, expressly provided for coordination between UNCI-
TRAL and UNIDROIT on the project.48  Thus, UNCITRAL already
recognizes the work of UNIDROIT and its importance for a possible
project.
Moreover, the history of the CISG shows the long-term historical rela-
tionship between the work of UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL in the area of
international sales law.  In fact, the text of the CISG is derived to a large
extent from the Hague Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods,49 a convention drafted and promulgated by
UNIDROIT.50
But unlike the earlier transformation of one international conven-
tion—the Hague Convention on International Sale of Goods—to a revised
convention—the CISG—what is proposed is the general adaptation of a
non-binding set of principles into a binding convention.  Thus, it is worth
exploring whether there are distinct advantages to a binding convention
that justifies this project as a supplement to the UNIDROIT Principles.
Soft law instruments, such as the Principles, generally fall into one of
two categories: those that are intended as the basis for legislation, and
those that are not.  For those soft law instruments, such as model laws, that
are specifically intended to be the basis for adoption by individual jurisdic-
46. This balancing of different legal traditions and domestic laws is not simply
a distinction between common law and civil law.  For example, the new provisions
in the Principles on conditions are not only inconsistent with the common law, but
also the law of Germany.
47. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 7.
48. See UNCITRAL Report, supra note 4, ¶ 131.
49. Id. ¶¶ 128–30.
50. For a discussion of the history of the CISG from its beginnings at
UNIDROIT in 1929, see MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACT LAW 301–05 (3d ed. 2005).
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tions, many51 have been most successful in setting international and do-
mestic standards for legislation.52
Moreover, as with a treaty or convention, those model laws that are
intended to be adopted as drafted or with minor revisions are often sub-
ject to the same political pressures of harmonization and the same need to
conform to specific legal traditions of domestic laws because the drafters
of the model law have the same concerns of ratification and
coordination.53
Conversely, statements of principles such as the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples, the UNIDROIT and American Law Institute Principles of Transna-
tional Civil Procedure, and the many American Law Institute Restatements
of the Law have all been drafted without the express purpose of adoption
and therefore were not drafted with the external demands of harmoniza-
tion.  For this reason they have often achieved a neutrality and balance
that would not otherwise be possible with the demands for harmonization.
This was the case with the UNIDROIT Principles, and it is not clear that
this same level of drafting independence could be achieved in the political
context of the drafting of a binding convention.
However, even with this limitation, the Principles could be highly in-
fluential in the drafting of a convention.  Various soft law instruments,
once completed, have often been influential in the further development
of the positive law.54  This can occur simply because they are a convenient
and ready source of law and therefore eliminate the difficulty of drafting
51. For example, legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Elec-
tronic Commerce has been adopted in Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Colombia,
France, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of
China, Ireland, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Slovenia, part of the
United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
52. Of course, actual conventions can sometimes be useful for setting interna-
tional commercial standards for further conventions.  This was clearly the case with
the UNIDROIT Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods in 1964, which was the basis for the CISG.
53. Thus, many model laws, such as the Model Law on Electronic Commerce,
have been used for domestic legislation because they were determined to be well-
drafted.  Moreover, model laws can be used as a template for related legislation.
Thus for example, the Model Law of Electronic Commerce was a source for the
American Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, the Canadian Uniform Electronic
Commerce Act, and the Australian Electronic Transactions Act.
The history and development of the UNCITRAL Model Law of Electronic
Commerce differed from and influenced the American Uniform Electronic Trans-
actions Act. See Henry Deeb Gabriel, The New United States Uniform Electronic Trans-
actions Act: Substantive Provisions, Drafting History and Comparison to the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Electronic Commerce, 5 UNIF. L. REV. 651, 651–64 (2000).  The Model
Law of Electronic Commerce also influenced the Canadian and Australian legisla-
tion. See Henry D. Gabriel, The Fear of the Unknown: The Need to Provide Special Proce-
dural Protections in International Electronic Commerce, 50 LOY. L. REV. 307, 322–31
(2004).
54. That the Principles might be used as the basis for legislation has long
been acknowledged. See, e.g., BONELL, supra note 50, at 243–48.
15
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new law,55 but there also can be a more conscious adoption because it is
thought that soft law instruments represent the correct result.56
A. Benefits of a Binding Convention
As to the specific advantages of a convention over the non-binding
Principles, there are two significant drawbacks to soft law instruments.
The first drawback is the inability to meet the need for certainty of en-
forcement, and the second is the concern that the soft law instruments
have not been tested in the political process.
In some areas of international commercial law, certainty of the law
and the enforcement of the specific rules is a necessity.  Because interna-
tional conventions are binding, once they are ratified they have the advan-
tage of instant uniformity and enforceability.  Thus, for example, the Cape
Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment Con-
vention57 and the accompanying Protocol to the Convention on Interna-
tional Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft
Equipment58 give an enforceable basis for secured financing of an aircraft
in the international market.  It would now be unreasonable to expect in-
ternational financing of a multi-billion dollar aircraft without the level of
certainty and protection afforded parties by the clear enforceable rules
and remedies provided for by the convention.
Conversely, an agreement to use a particular set of rules, such as the
UNIDROIT Principles, is not self-enforcing, but rather requires some do-
mestic law for its enforcement.  This, in many circumstances could lead to
uncertainty because the parties may not know in advance whether the gov-
55. Describing the influence of the American Uniform Commercial Code and
the Restatement Second of Contracts on the drafting of the UNIDROIT Principles,
the late Professor Allan Farnsworth noted, “[U]nlike any other common lawyer, I
came with texts in statutory form: the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts.  No decision of a common law tribunal—not even
the House of Lords—was as persuasive as a bit of blackletter text.”  Farnsworth,
supra note 39, at 1990 (footnote omitted).
56. Of course some of the most successful soft law instruments, such as the
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits and the INCOTERMS,
were specifically drafted for use by a large number of contracting parties because
they reflect common well-established business practices, and for this reason they
are in fact the de facto legal standards for the transactions they govern.  Thus,
although not designed as models for further legislation, they have in fact become
such.  For example, the letter of credit provisions of the American Uniform Com-
mercial Code draw heavily from the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documen-
tary Credits. See Katherine A. Barski, Letters of Credit: A Comparison of Article 5 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits,
41 LOY. L. REV. 735, 736 (1996).
57. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285.
58. Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equip-
ment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285.
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss4/11
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR411.txt unknown Seq: 17 11-JUL-13 8:39
2013] UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES 677
erning terms of the agreement will be enforced according to their express
wishes.59
It may well be that a convention has some attractiveness over the Prin-
ciples because it would be vetted in the political process and therefore it
may reflect concerns that might not have surfaced or been articulated in
the more isolated drafting process of the Principles.  With the drafting of a
convention, political forces will strongly influence the process at two
stages—during the drafting, and during the ratification process.  During
the drafting, representative governments will have a strong sense of what is
in their best interests, and these interests will be strongly argued, debated,
and lobbied during the drafting process.  Moreover, it is common in orga-
nizations, such as UNCITRAL, to have wide representation by industry and
business organizations that will also press their concerns.  This process of
vetting, compromise, and ultimate acceptance usually reflects instruments
that are acceptable to the various constituencies and therefore are likely to
result in a wide acceptance.
It is too early to tell whether the Principles will have a wide level of
acceptance and use, but the Principles did evolve through a more insular
process than can be expected in a UNCITRAL working group.  It may also
be the case that a UNCITRAL convention, which would likely reflect prac-
tical, specific problems that call for fact-specific rules, as opposed to ab-
stract principles, could lend more certainty and less divergence in
interpretation.
However, because of the various compromises for acceptable results, a
convention may not reflect the best practices but merely reflect acceptable
practices.  Moreover, irrespective of the quality of a convention, such an
agreement has no force unless it is adopted.  That of course, presupposes
that the various constituencies do not bring the project to a standstill and
death before the completion of the project because of an inability of the
various stakeholders to agree upon a final text at all.
B. UNIDROIT Principles as a Template for a Convention
on Global Contract Law
If the proposal for a new global contract law convention proceeds at
UNCITRAL, the UNIDROIT Principles may serve as an ideal template
both for those areas covered by the CISG60 as well as those areas outside
the CISG’s scope.  The Principles have the advantage of being contempo-
rary as well as having been drafted with a universal, and not a regional,
59. This problem should not be overstated.  A large proportion of interna-
tional legal disputes are resolved in arbitration, and generally the party’s choice of
law will control in arbitration irrespective of the underlying substantive domestic
law.  Moreover, absent some direct conflict with domestic policy, most domestic
laws provide for a strong rule of party autonomy.
60. Presumably both the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles would be possi-
ble sources for a new convention that covered the areas already covered by the
CISG.
17
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perspective.  The gestation period for the Principles expanded over thirty
years.  During that time, not only did the various working groups61 have
the luxury of time and reflection, but there have also been innumerable
sources of scholarly and professional commentary as well as a growing
body of judicial opinions and arbitral awards that have analyzed the Princi-
ples.62  The Principles have been tested and have been shown as clear,
balanced, and reflective of contemporary international business practices.
Thus, if the project is viable, a realistic way forward is to replicate the
creation of the CISG by relying on an initial product from UNIDROIT
that provides for UNIDROIT’s distinct working methods, and then use
that work as the basis for a UNCITRAL convention on global contract
law.63  This would entail a close working relationship between UNIDROIT
and UNCITRAL.
To the extent that a new convention would include and supersede the
scope of the CISG, there is precedent for this, for as noted above, the
CISG is based on a pre-existing UNIDROIT text, the 1964 Hague Conven-
tion on the International Sale of Goods.  The growth of the law is cumula-
tive, and as with the CISG, the law is often best served by expanding on its
existing foundations and not by attempting to develop law as if it were
from a blank slate.64
61. The Principles were drafted in three versions: 1994, 2004, and 2010, with
each new version adding to the work’s prior version.  Although with some overlap-
ping membership, each version had its own working group.
62. These judicial opinions and arbitral awards are collected on the UNILAW
database maintained by UNIDROIT. See Instruments Adopted by UNIDROIT, INT’L
INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE L., http://www.unidroit.info/program.cfm?
menu=subject&file=convention&lang=en (last visited Apr.11, 2013).
63. This, of course, was the method for the drafting of the CISG.
64. It may be that UNCITRAL has already accepted the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples as the proper source of law in those areas where the scope of the CISG does
not extend.  For the 2010 Commission decision, see UNCITRAL Report, supra
note 4, ¶ 140.  For the 2007 Commission decision, see Rep. of United Nations
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, June 25–July 12, 2007, ¶ 213, UN Doc. A/62/17 (Part
I).  The 2007 UNCITRAL Report states:
[The UNIDROIT Principles] shall be applied when the parties have
agreed that their contract be governed by them,
They may be applied when parties have agreed that their contract be gov-
erned by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the like, . . . [and]
when the parties have not chosen any law to govern their contract,
They may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law
instruments, . . . [and] to interpret or supplement domestic law,
They may serve as a model for national and international legislators.
Id.  In this respect, it would appear to be redundant for UNCITRAL to embark on
drafting law that already exists as far as UNCITRAL is concerned.
18
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V. FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF A CONVENTION
ON GLOBAL SALES LAW
Where does this leave us?  The proposal asserts, but gives no evidence,
that a global contract law is needed.65  This alone is likely to be the most
important consideration among the member states of UNCITRAL in the
deliberations about whether to move forward.
It has been argued by some that the project merely replicates the
work accomplished by the UNIDROIT Principles, and therefore would be
an unnecessary waste of resources.  To this, there may be the response that
the benefits of a binding convention justify the new project.  This has yet
to be shown, but may well be the case.
What might be the major hurdles if the project moves forward?  First,
it is worth noting that the CISG took over thirty years to complete and it is
very limited in scope.  A new global contract law convention would inevita-
bly have within its scope the coverage of the CISG.  Second, there has
been no serious discussion that the CISG itself needs to be revised.  A revi-
sion of the CISG would entail a major disruption of existing international
commercial law and would create the problem of inconsistent duplicate
conventions when no substantial problems with the current CISG have
been articulated.  As noted above, this specific fear was the basis for the
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in
International Contracts66 serving as a free-standing convention instead of
an addendum to the CISG.
The broader scope of the proposed convention on global contract law
would additionally expand into areas specifically avoided by the CISG.  Al-
though many of these areas of contract law are covered in the UNIDROIT
Principles, as has been discussed above, these subjects are not necessarily
subject to easy agreement in a binding convention.  In fact, it is not clear
that the working methods of UNCITRAL lend themselves to the level of
detail needed for a convention along the lines set out in the proposal.
Before beginning any endeavor such as the one proposed, it may well
be worth considering the difficulty in contract law revision that has oc-
curred domestically and regionally.  For example, in the United States, the
revision of the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code failed
after thirteen years of work because various vested interests feared the ef-
fect of a new statute.67  Conversely, the most contentious aspects of the
65. This is certainly the position proffered by the United States Department
of State, as well as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. See Keith Loken, A New Global Initiative on Contract Law in UNCITRAL: Right
Project, Right Forum?, 58 VILL. L. REV. 509, 509 (2013).
66. United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in
International Contracts, Nov. 23, 2005, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/electcom/06-57452_Ebook.pdf.
67. These revisions should have been successful. See Henry Deeb Gabriel, The
Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code—How Successful Has It Been?, 52 HASTINGS
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revisions, those dealing with computer software contracts, were hardly no-
ticed when they were incorporated into a non-binding instrument.68
There have been difficulties at the regional level as well.  For exam-
ple, we need only look at the recent work in Europe to come up with a
European contract law.  Starting work in 1982, the Commission on Euro-
pean Contract Law began work on the Principles of European Contract
Law.  After twenty years of work, this project was completed in 2002.  It has
not been adopted as positive law.  In 2009, another attempt at European
contract law was created with the Draft Common Frame of Reference.  At
this time, the Draft Common Frame of Reference is considered too un-
wieldy and has been placed on the academic top shelf to collect dust.
There is now the more recent Common European Sales Law that is pres-
ently being vetted.  It has yet to gain any traction.  All of these projects
were in the context of a somewhat similar civil law framework.  How this
could be achieved across other legal traditions is not clear.
VI. CONCLUSION
UNCITRAL is now looking at the serious question of whether a revi-
sion or expansion of the CISG is a viable project that justifies the re-
sources.  Among the problems this project might encounter is a lack of
resources, a clear articulation of the need for the project, the inability to
define its scope, and the likelihood of widespread ratification within a rea-
sonable time.  Recent attempts to revise domestic and regional laws are
instructive about the possible problems this project may have.
It may be that the barriers for a future convention on global contract
law is not a realistic project, and the more recent path of soft law instru-
ments, such as the UNIDROIT Principles, is a more viable method of pro-
viding global uniformity in contract.  Alternatively, another path is to
replicate the creation of the CISG by relying on an initial product from
UNIDROIT that provides for UNIDROIT’s distinct working methods, and
then have that work as the basis for a UNCITRAL convention on global
contract law.  This would entail a close working relationship between
UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL.
L.J. 653, 655–57 (2001).  Unfortunately, the revisions were not successful. See
Gabriel, supra note 40, at 489–91.
68. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS (Ten-
tative Draft No. 1, 2008).
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